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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for a Writ of Mandamus to be issued out of this court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The general authority for such a writ is Rule 65B
(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the specific authority for this particular type of action is set forth in Section 20-11-16, Utah Code Ann. 1953.
The petition for the writ, including all of the attached exhibits filed in this court generally set forth the
facts involved in this case. Some facts as are seriously
in issue have been settled by the stipulation of the parties which is on file herein.
On February 19, 1953 the City Council of Cedar City,
Utah duly passed an ordinance granting to Southern
Utah Power Company a twenty year electric franchise
within Cedar City, Utah. This ordinance which is set forth
as Petitioners' Exhibit "A" was published February 26
and by its terms would become effective March 21, 1953.
On March 7, 1953 nine reside·nts of Cedar City, Utah who
acted as "sponsors" filed an application for petition
copies with the City Recorder in order to have petitions
printed so that the ordina·nce could be referred to the
people for their approval or rejection at the next city
election. Five copies of the proposed Petition for Referendum were filed with the application and the application was duly verified as provided by law. Upon the filing,
the City Recorder gave a receipt therefor and also signed
a certificate that the petition following was a true and
correct copy. The sponsors then had the petitions and
circulation sheets printed up themselves at the Iron
County Record, a publishing and printing company of
Cedar City, Utah. There were printed up fifteen sections
of the petition, with each section having a cover sheet of
the Referendum Petition, together with the printed certi·
ficate of the City Recorder, and also six circulation sheets
attached: On March 10, 1953 after the petitions had been
printed by the sponsors, all fifteen sections \vere taken
to the City Recorder for her inspection and for her to
sign her name in ink over her printed signature and to
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attach the corporate seal of Cedar City Corporation.
This she declined to do and on March 12 notified the
sponsors that the fifteen sections of the petition could
be obtained at her office but that that they would not be
signed and sealed by her. They were later received back
by the sponsors, unsigned but since the City Recorder
had notified the sponsors that she would not sign them,
the sponsors, who had had printed originally sufficient
petitions and circulation sheets for fifteen additional
identical sections, commenced the circulation of the petition in Cedar City, Utah, and 449 signatures were obtained.
The fifteen sections \Vere then taken to the County
Clerk of Iron County, Utah on March 20, 1953 for checking against his official registration list of registered and
qualified voters in Cedar City, Utah. He duly certified
that in 1952 at the general election, 3122 persons of all
parties voted for all candidates for Governor in Cedar
City, Utah and that the Referendum Petition presented
to him for checking had the names of 430 duly registered
and qualified voters of Cedar City, Utah. The Clerk also
certified as shown in Exhibit "E" that 430 qualified and
registered voters appeared on the petition and that he
had placed a check mark before each name of a qualified and registered voter. Actually the check marks were
placed after the name and there were 430 such checked
names. The County Clerk subsequently on March 27, 1953
certified as shown in Exhibit "E-1" that actually he had
placed the check mark (V) after the name and that
those not so checked with the check mark ( V) did not
appear to be duly registered. There were 19 of these
names.
On March 20, 1953 during the afternoo·n of said day,
which was a day before the franchise ordinance would
have become effective, all fifteen sections of the Referendum Petition, together with the County Clerk's certificates, were delivered to the City Recorder's office_ in
the County Clerk's sealed envelope. On March 24, 1953
the sponsors were notified that the City Recorder had
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found the petition insufficient for the reason that it carried NO names of registered voters. According to Section
20-11-22, Utah Code Ann. 1953, the required number of
signers of a referendum petition in Cedar City, Utah
based upon the vote in 1952 for Governor would be 390
names. The County Clerk has certified that there \Yere
430 names of registered and qualified voters on the
petition.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Referendum Petition, although printed and paid
for by the sponsors themselves is entirely legal and
proper and would have to be accepted by the City Recorder provided it carried the required number of
qualified signers.
2. That the Refere·ndum Petition circulated was duly
certified to and the fact that each section of the petition was not signed in the hand-writing of the City
Recorder cannot be relied upon by the defendants
as any defense.
3. Any deficiencies in the County Clerk's Certificate as
to how the names of the :registered voters were
checked is immaterial, particularly in view of the
fact the clerical error was corrected and in any
event, the sponsors were not notified of any deficiency until it was too late to correct it.

1.

ARGUMENT
The procedure for direct legislation, or Initiative and
Referendum, is set out in Title 20, Chapter 11, Utah Code
Ann. 1953. The right of direct legislation is probably
one of the most fundamental rights of the people under
democratic government. In fact this right is preserved
by our State Constitution at Article VI, Section 1. Di·
rect legislatio·n by Initiative and Referendum by the people is actually encouraged in our govern1nental and
judicial system because in the last analysis, all govern·
mental power still resides in the people. Although Chap·
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ter 11 of Title 20 sets out the procedure, it is clear from
reading the chapter and also from several decisions
handed down by this court, that many of the requirements are matters of form only and are directory and
are not to interfere with the rights of the people to vote
in direct legislation elections. The general rule of law is
that these statutes should be liberally construed so as to
preserve this valuable right and this court in the case of
Halgren vs. Welling, 63 Pac. 2nd. 550 and Allen vs. Rasmussen, 117 Pac. 2nd. 287 has adhered to this ge·neral
rule. The reasons are aptly given in the Halgren case; to
quote.
"The right of direct legislation is in the people. It
is the duty of officers charged with administration
matters relating to the Initiative and Referendum
Law to make it effective and operative if possible.
Technical and restrictive constructions placed upo·n
such laws \vould tend to defeat the purpose and policies governing the submission of such measures to
the people for adoption. With the best safeguards
that can be thrown around the preparation, circulation, assembling, and submitting of petitions relati'ng
to the Initiative or Referendum Law, inaccuracies,
and at times technical departures from prescribed
forms, are likely to occur. The rigid application of
technical constructions relating to the law, if made
by officers charged with the administration thereof,
may effectively defeat the purposes of the law. Officers should interpret the law, if possible, so as to
sustain it and make its purposes effective, and bring
about the purposes intended by the legislature. As
heretofore indicated, the forms prescribed are not
mandatory, and if they are substantially followed
the petition should be held to be sufficient notwithstanding merely technical errors as to form."
There is one unfortunate feature in Chapter 11 of
Title 20 in that the entire act is drawn primarily for
Initiative measures, as distinguished from merely local
Referendums of City Ordinances. Since a statewide InitiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ative is a considerable undertaking on the part of a group
of citizens who usually have no personal motive or nothing to gain by the action and would be at considerable expense, in fact so much that in many instances the cost
would discourage the use of the direct legislative machinery, the statute has attempted to make the procedure within the financial reach of all. Section 20-11-13
provides that whe·n an application for Petition copies is
filed, the Secretary of State shall within ten days solicit
"bids from not less than three competent printers for
the printing of the petitions." The Secretary of State
shall notify the sponsors within the ten days of the lowest and best bid and request the cost to be paid to hin1
by the spoi1sors. The printing is to be in six point type
which is admittedly quite small, but this surely is only to
keep the cost of printing down. Within ten days after the
cost of printing is received from the sponsors, the Secretary· of State is to have the petitions and circulation
sheets printed and bound and ready for delivery to the
sponsors. The provisions of this particular section are
obviously only directory and for the protection of the
sponsors themselves. In a statewide initiative procedure,
where a lengthy law is proposed, it is conceivable that
the cost of printing the sufficient petitions could run into
hundreds of dollars and this statute is obviously enacted
to keep the cost to a minimum. Chapter 20, Section 21
provides that cities and towns may adopt the statewide
procedure and in such cases, the City Recorder performs
the functions of the Secretary of State.
In this particular case, instead of having a statewide
initiative measure, we have only .a local city referendum.
The printing cost is a minor item and since the statute in
question is only for the protection of the sponsors themselves, they could waive it if they so chose. It is elemen·
tary that any person or group can waive a contract provision or statute which is entirely for their own protection
if other rights are not involved. On this point 56 Am. Jur.
Page 109 provides:
"Statutory rights may be \Vaived or surrendered
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in \Yhole or in part by the party to whom or for
\vhose benefit they are given, if he does not thereby
destroy the rights, and benefits flowing to another ... "
Since the sponsors have to pay the cost of printing in
any event, regardless of what the cost may be, and no
part comes from public funds, it would make no difference if the city or the sponsors printed up the petitions.
It is submitted that the statutory procedure is only set
out as a guide to get the work done and to make it as
cheap for the sponsors as possible. Surely the City Recorder or city officials would have no_ cause to complain
if the sponsors handled this themselves, so long as it was
done according to law.
To further show that the failure of the city to have
these petitions printed is a matter of minor importance is
the fact that the City Recorder in fact did solicit bids for
the printing and received only one bid, one from the
printing firm which had previously printed them. lt is
of interest to note that the City Recorder sent out the
request for bids on the same day the printed petitions
were presented to her for signature. The petitioners contend that this is truly being a slave to the statute. It is
of further interest to note that the bid actually received
from the one printer was in the small suin of $8.65 and it
is submitted that the payment of this small sum by the
nine sponsors would not and did not strain their finances.
If the City had been prejudiced in any way by the printing of this petition by the sponsors themselves and payi'ng for its cost, then the situation might be different.
Since the City could in no way be prejudiced by the
fact that the sponsors immediately went ahead with the
printing upon filing the application with the City Recorder, waiting for a possible twenty days for the printed
petitions to be delivered to them by the City Recorder
would be needless and foolish to say the least. Under the
statute, the City Recorder could have takeri a minimum
of twenty days to get this all done and since the petitions as actually printed conform to the law in every way,
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except possibly the fact that they were printed in 5~~
point type instead of 6 point type, '''hich objection is entirely groundless, no one has any right now to complain.
At this point attention should be called to one glaring deficiency in the direct legislation statute, \vhich is
the shortness of time for a referendum petition to be
filed, particularly on a city ordinance. Initiative creates
no problem as it can be done at any time but a city referendum petition must be filed before the ordinance becomes effective which is by law twenty days after publication or thirty days after passage, which ever of said
days is the most remote from final passage. In this instance there was only the thirty days from passage
which would be March 21, 1953. If the sponsors must file
their application for petitions and wait for a possible
twenty days before they can start circulating their petition, in many cases there would be no referendum at all
because an unfriendly City Recorder can take the full
time allowed by law and there would be little if any time
to circulate, check and file the petition. It must be admitted that occasions when opponents of a city measure
can file an application for a petition, immediately after
the passage of the act ~re rare. A committee must first
organize and this normally would take several days.
Furthermore, the City Recorder could if she so desired,
wait for ten days or longer before he delivered the adopted ordinance to a publisher for publishing, in which event
there would be only twenty days in which opponents
could organize, file an application for petition copies and
have them printed, circulated and checked and filed and
as noted, under the procedure the city recorder can legal·
ly take at least twenty days to get this done if she so
desires, leaving n9 time to obtain any signatures.
It is true as pointed out in the case of Allen Ys. Ras~
mussen, supra, when this shortness of time in a city ref·
erendum was considered by this court, the court l't'marked that it could not be said that the sponsors could
not have sufficient time, but the point which the }Jetition·
ers wish to make is this-in vie-.v of the general rule of
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law that these statutes should be liberally construed, is it
more important to follow the statute strictly even on
immaterial and directory rna tters than it is to afford the
citizenry of the right to vote on 1neasures? It most certainly would be wrong to have an unco-operative City
Recorder or City Administration foil an attempt to question a city measure by merely taking the time allowed
by law, but this could be done in many instances.
It is admittedly disturbing to the writer that cases
cannot be found in the reports in which sponsors of a
referendum petition did not want to wait on the public
official to have the printing done, but did it and paid for
it themselves. It appears to the writer that the question
is so obvious that no case has been tried and appealed
where this situation was involved. There is one Arizona
case, however, that of Kerby vs. Griffin 62 Pac. 2nd 1131
where a related problem arose. In that case an initiative
petition had been filed with the Secretary of State. Under the Arizona law, as in ours, the Secretary of State
had the duty of printing up and mailing out publicity
pamphlets for and against the measure and this had to
done within a certain time before election. In this case,
the defendant Secretary of State maintained that the
reason he had not complied with the law was because
as the law was written, there was not sufficient time to
comply, particularly whe·n he would have to solicit bids
for the printing of the pamphlet and then get it printed
and mailed. Soliciting of bids for the printing was not directly required in the Arizona Initiative and Referendum
law. The Arizona court said that although the practice
of soliciting bids on state printing was commendable and
under all ordinary circumstances should be done, still,
where it interfered with the getting of the direct legislation question before the people, it should be by all
means dispensed with. And in this instance, public funds
were being used for the printing of this pamphlet and
not private funds from the sponsors themselves, as in
the present case.
There are cases in which certain requirements of
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the statute have not been complied with but the writer
has found none on the specific question here involved.
In the case of Halgren vs. Welling, Supra, there \vere
many irregularities pointed out and the court said they
were merely matters of form and were disregarded.
Therefore, it would seem that the fact that the sponsors handled and paid for their own printing is immaterial i'n this case for two reasons, (1) that the statute is for
the protection of the sponsors themselves and they could
waive if they so desired and (2) this is only a directory
requirement and not mandatory and to hold that it is
mandatory would require a useless act and would prohibit, in many cases the use of our direct legislation statute.
The second point raised by the answer of the defendants is the fact that the petition circulated did not have
a certified copy of the referendum petition attached
thereto. Section 20-11-12 and 20-11-13 Utah Code Ann.
1953 provide that the petition for circulation can be divided i'nto sections but that each section of circulations
sheets must have attached a certified copy of the referendum petition. This is only as it should be because it
would be wrong for circulators of the petition to merely
take · around circulation sheets asking people to sign
without the signers knowing what they were signing. It
is common knowledge that people \Viii sign any kind of
petition or anything .requested of them and the statute
requires that a copy of the petition must be attached to
each section. Defendants appear to be raising the question that the copies were not properly certified and by
this it is presumed that they mean that each certificate
attached to the petition was not signed in ink over the
printed signature of the City Recorder and because such
was not the case, the petitions \vere not certified. Each
bore the printed name of the Recorder and she had previously signed a certificate that the petition was a true
and correct copy of the petition filed with her and thi~
certificate is before the Court as Petitio·ner's Exhibit
"H". The petitioners maintain, that this signing was not
necessary in order to have a certified copy of the petition
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with each section circulated. The Recorder had in fact
signed such a certificate and the petition copies were as
they are designated, "petition copies". Furthermore, no
claim is made that the form or substance of the petition
would in any way mislead any signer and if a signer was
willing to sign the petition as presented to him and which
is before the court, no one would have any cause to complain.
It should also be noted that there is no allegation of
fraud or wrongdoing on the part of the sponsors in circulating the petition. The ordinance asked to be referred
is correctly described on the face of the petition and
there is no claim that signers did not have full knowledge
of what they were requesting the City Officials to do. It
is submitted that the very form of the petition circulated
speaks for itself as to its full validity.
·
Defendants appear to be making capital of the fact
that the petitions signed were not the ones presented to
the City Recorder for her signing, sealing and inspection.
Actually they were not but were identical copies as they
were all printed up at the same time and this could not
possibly make any difference. Furthermore, there is no
claim on the part of the defendants there was any difference or that the sponsors wrongfully substituted sonlething else. At any rate, the sections originally delivered
to the Recorder for signing and sealing were actually
returned unsealed and unsigned so that they were identical in every way with the ones circulated.
But it ill-behooves the defendants to now assert that
the petitions were not signed by the Recorder, or numbered or authorized by her. After the petitions and circulation sheets had been printed by the sponsors according
to the statutes they were in fact presented to the Recorder for her inspection and for the express purpose of ha ving her sign them in ink and to affix the corporate seal.
This she declined to do and returned the petitions unsigned. The defendants certainly cannot now be heard
to complain that other identical copies were circulated
or that they were not signed in ink.
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The third point to be made by the petitioners raised
by the defendants is the fact that the certificate of the
County Clerk of Iron County as to the number of registered voters is erroneous. This appears to have even less
weight, if possible, than the other points raised. Let us
look at the facts. Section 20-11-16, Utah Code, Ann. 1953
requires that the names on the petitions be checked by
the County Clerk in order to determine if the signers are
registered voters. The case of Allen vs. Rasmussen, supra,
held that the sponsors had the obligation of getting this
done themselves before filing the petition with the City
Recorder. This was complied with. The case of Halgren
vs. Welling, supra also held thai: the word "check" as
used in the statute means that the County Clerk shall
compare the names on the referendum petition with the
names on his registration lists to determine if the signers
are duly registered. This was all done in the County
Clerk's office March 20, 1953. Plaintiffs submit that as to
where on the petition the Clerk designated the registered
voters or whether he made such designation is entirely
immaterial. So long as he certified that there were names
of 430 registered voters is the important thing. Merely
placing a check either after or before the name of each
person as appeared to be registered was merely for the
convenience of the City Recorder whe·n she checked over
the signatures. But the City Recorder has chosen torefuse the petition in toto. To now hold that merely because
the Clerk said he placed a check mark in front of each
name of those who appeared to be registered whereas the
check mark appears after the na1ne invalidates the petition, would be fantastic to say the least. The petitions
are before the court and it should be perfectly obvious
from them that the names of the persons duly registered
were marked and that there should be no room for doubt
in the matter. To now say that because they \vere not
checked where the County Clerk said they were, would
be allowing an innocent mistake on the part of a public
officer to vitiate the entire proceeding to the detrin1ent
of all of the hundreds of people \vho wanted to vote on
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the measure. It would be a mo·nstrosity indeed to deprive
the public of this right merely bec:tuse of a simple clerical
error on the part of the public official. But at any rate,
when this was discovered by the County Clerk upon notification by the City Recorder on March 24th, the County
Clerk submitted another certificate, marked Exhibit
"E-1" clarifying his action if such were in fact needed.
A California case, vVillett vs. J orda·n, 35 Pac. 2nd 1025 is
particularly apt on this point. There the County Clerk
certified to the Secretary of State that on the petition
filed in his office there were the names of so many duly
registered voters but the amount certified to was incorrect as actually there were several thousand more names,"
and four days later, but after the filing deadline, the
County Clerk discovered his error and made a new certificate of the correct number. The new certificate was
made three days after the filing deadline. It so happened
that the mistake was very material because the difference in the count made the difference of whether there
were sufficient names or not. The court said that the last
certificate related back to the first so that it would be on
time. The court said further.
"To refuse its application under the facts disclosed
would countenance a palpable injustice to those who,
at great expense and effort, did all that was required
of them by law, and had established the antecedent
right to have their petition recognized as sufficient.
The correction of the admitted mistake of the public
officer, the County Clerk, and the amendment of the
original certificate by him must therefore be deemed to date back to the time of the filing of the certificate originally filed."
~dded to this is the fact that the City Recorder, as held
In the case of Allen vs. Rasmussen, supra, owes the duty
to. notify the sponsors before the filing deadline of any
deficiency in signatures, but waited for four days to do so
the City Recorder cannot now be heard to say that th~
certificate of the County Clerk was insufficient.
The plaintiffs maintain that the defendants cannot rely
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now upon any deficiency they claim existed in the County
Clerk's certificate for two main reasons, first, because
the Defendants had an opportunity to recount the signatures after the new or supplemental certificate of the
County· Clerk was filed with the City Recorder but still
failed to change their count, and second, because the City
Recorder had the opportunity to notify the sponsors of
any deficiency in the County Clerk's Certificate but failed
to do so until four days after the filing of the petition
and three days after the filing deadline. Petitioner's exhibit "F" which is the certificate of the City Recorder in
which the referendum petition was designated as insufficient for the reason that it co·ntained NO names of
registered voters, was delivered to the sponsors on March
24th or three days after the filing deadline. The Allen vs
Ra.sriiu-ssen case held that the City Recorder owed a duty
to· notify the ·sponsors in sufficient time, if any there was,
for- them to correct any insufficiency. In fact Section 2011-16 so states. If there was any doubt in the mind of the
City Recorder as to the County Clerk's certificate, she
had the duty to notify the sponsors and they would then
have had an opportunity to correct or rectify any deficiency. When they were not notified until three days
after the filing deadline they had no opportunity to get
a corrected certificate from the County Clerk and file it
prior to the expiration of March 21st. It would have been
a simple rna tter to rectify this had the sponsors been so
advised. ·
CONCLUSIONS
Therefore, plaintiffs argue that their prayer for a ~'rit
of Mandamus, compelling the defendants and in par·
t~c;ular the City Recorder to accept the referendum petiti~n should be granted for the following reasons:
1. The Referendum petition, although completely print·
ed and paid for directly by the sponsors rather than
~.~!t!:gg_f~r th.e City Recorder to do so, was entirely legal
as. to form and substance. That the only statute not followed to the letter is the one pertaining to the manner of
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soliciting bids on the printing and this is entirely for the
benefit and protection of the sponsors themselves and it
could therefore be waived. To hold otherwise would mean
that sponsors have to comply with a useless restriction
which \vould make the submission of referendums to the
people very difficult and this right should not be allowed
to be abrogated by unfriendly city officials.
2. The petitions circulated were properly certified
copies of the petition filed with the City Recorder and
the defendants cannot now be heard to say they are ·not
when they failed to comply with the sponsors' request to
sign and seal them. Furthermore, there as no claim that
any signer was mislead iri any way by the petition circulated, or that there was any fraud.
3. The mere clerical errors of the County Clerk in his
certificate as to the checking of the names is immaterial
as the petition itself is clear on its face who are the registered voters and the certificate of the Clerk as to the
number is the important thing anyway. No o·ne in Iron
County was better qualified to know who were registered
voters and he has certified that there are sufficient
names on the petition. If there is any deficiency in his
certificates, the City had the duty to notify the spo·nsors
so that they could rectify any mistake, if any there be,
which the defendants failed to do.
Petitioners contend that the defendants have not in
fact shown any valid cause for not accepting as sufficient
the referendum petition proffered to them and that their
refusal to accept it is capricious and arbitrary to say the
least, and that a peremptory writ should issue.
In support of the plaintiffs' prayer and motion for an
attorney fee for their counsel in this matter in the event
the Court sees fit to issue a Writ ot Mandamus, the plaintiffs call attention to the affidavit of the sponsors a·nd
also their counsel. The court has before it ample evidence
of the reasonableness of an attorney fee. If the Court
grants this writ, it will only be because the action of the
defe·ndants and particularly that of the City Recorder was
arbitrary and capricious and the failure to perform a
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public duty enjoined by law. The plaintiffs as sponsors
have been forced to compel the defendants to do \\'hat
the law requires them to do. In this they have suffered
damage, particularly in the incurring or paying of an
attorney fee. The sponsors and plaintiffs have no pecuniary interest in this proceeding and are only pursuing
this remedy as citizens and voters in Cedar City, Utah.
The proof shows that the sponsors have agreed to pay a
reasonable attorney fee as set by their counsel and their
counsel has shown the services rendered and their reasonable value. It is true that the granting or refusing an attorney fee is discretionery with the court but it would
appear that the action of the defendants as the duly elected officials of Cedar City, Utah is so arbitrary and capricious that there is little room to doubt their motives in
this matter. The court has statutory authority to grant
an attorney fee by Section 78-35-9, Utah Code Ann. 1953
which provides.
"If judgment is given for applicant, he may recover
damages·which he has sustained as found by the jury
or as may be determined by the court or referees
upon a reference ordered, together with costs and
for such damage and costs an execution may issue
and a peremptory mandate must be awarded without delay."
This court, i'n the case of the Colorado Development Co.
vs. Creer, 80 Pac. 2nd 914 has held that in mandamus proceedings, damages properly include attorney fees, where
properly shown. Therefore, the court has authority for
the award of such a fee and it is submitted that the
right for it is properly shown.
ORVILLE ISOM
Attorney for PlaintiffsPetitioners.
Cedar City, Utah.
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